From 8:30 A.M. until 12:30 P.M. on August 13, I participated in a Washington, D.C. conference sponsored by the Hudson Institute concerning "The Montebello Summit and the Future of North America".

The Hudson Institute conference dealt with the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and the North American Union (NAU). The only speaker who made the case against the integration of North America (undermining the status of America as an independent Constitutional republic) was Dr John Fonte. Other speakers included Dr. Barbara Kotschwar of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Dr. Robert Pastor of American University, Daniel Schwanen of the Center for International Governance and Innovation, Sidney Weintrab of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jaime Daremblum of the Hudson Institute, former Democrat Congressman James R. Jones, Greg Anderson of the University of Alberta, Christopher Sands of the Hudson Institute, and Ken Weinstein of the Hudson Institute.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IS A KEY GOAL

In a paper entitled "Negotiating North America: The Security and Prosperity Partnership", Professor Anderson and Mr. Sands made some of the following points: " The SPP process is the vehicle for the discussion of future arrangements for economic integration to create a single market for goods and services in North America…The design of the SPP is innovative, eschewing the more traditional diplomatic and trade negotiation models in favor of talks among civil service professionals and subject matter experts within each government. This design places the negotiation fully within the authority of the executive branch in the United States."

DECISION-MAKING BY TECHNOCRATS UNDERCUTS CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

"The SPP is the successor to two previous efforts that had stalled or expired prior to 2005. First, a set of trilateral working groups established in the NAFTA to look at harmonizing standards and eliminating differences in regulation…The design of the SPP is creative in handling asymmetry by attempting a less political, technocratic negotiation process; however, this has raised issues of transparency and accountability that threaten the future of the SPP process."

SECRECY IS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE POPULAR OPPOSITION

The authors acknowledge that "the process must be made more transparent to answer legitimate citizen concerns about potential outcomes". They go on to admit that "The design of the SPP is flawed by the exclusion of Congress from the process ".

"POLITICIZATION" IS GOOD – – – CONTROL BY UNACCOUNTABLE BUREAUCRATS IS BAD

The authors oppose politicization (which is another word for accountability to American citizens) saying "The design of the SPP made it difficult to include special interest input without politicizing the negotiations…the inclusion of some interest groups and not others resulted in a further erosion of confidence in the SPP process".

MANIPULATION OF CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE IS THE SPP STRATEGY

The authors observed that "The United States (i.e. George W. Bush) faces three important challenges in designing and conducting negotiations under the SPP: managing the asymmetry with smaller neighbors, managing Congress , which has a constitutional role on trade and must be persuaded to fund security measures; and the [sic] managing the pressures from special interests ".

U.S. SURRENDERS ITS ADVANTAGES

According to the authors, in order to persuade Canada and Mexico to fully cooperate with the Bush administration, it is important for the U.S. to be "structuring negotiations in such a way that the U.S. advantages are minimized, treating negotiators for Canada and Mexico as equals and partners and avoiding any explicit resort to its advantages of size…The United States has tried to overcome the defensive instincts of its neighbors by structuring negotiations in such a way that the U.S. advantages are minimized…Incentives for cooperation rise in the presence of expectations about benefits from future cooperation".

The authors also admit that "In the context of North America, and of deepening continental integration, the management of Congressional relations presents significant challenges for U.S. negotiators ".

AN INCREMENTAL MARCH TO THE NAU

Just as today's European Union began 50 years ago with the creation of the European Iron and Coal Community, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiations in the 1980s were a first step on the path toward a North American Union (NAU). These were preceded by the Trade Act of 1974, which created the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.

It is pointed out in the paper that "Perhaps the most important feature of the SPP design is that it is neither intended to produce a treaty nor an executive agreement like the NAFTA that would require congressional ratification or the passage of implementing legislation in the United States ."

CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT COULD UNDERCUT CONTROL BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

"The SPP was designed to function within existing administrative authority of the executive branch. Rules and standards could be set, law enforcement and national security prerogatives pursued, all within the broad parameters of constitutional authority or prior congressional authorization… With presidential and cabinet-level political support, the dozens of objectives outlined under each of the 20 SPP working groups would proceed on the basis of trilateral consultation at the staff-level within respective government agencies already responsible for those policy areas.

Shifting the substantive work of the SPP to the staff level

, much as the NAFTA working groups had done, would ostensibly depoliticize the policy work being done by leaving it in the hands of technical experts. Technocratic negotiations would reduce the power-politics dimension of the talks".

It is asserted that "while shifting responsibility for agenda items to the staff-level could potentially de-politicize work on small issues, it also effectively removed it from the kind of public accountability normally associated with U.S. trade negotiations".

It is also observed in the paper that "Another intervening factor that altered perceptions of the SPP between Waco and Cancun came in May of 2005 when the Council on Foreign Relations in the United Sates released its Independent Task Force Report No. 53, Building a North American Community". This report "recommended the establishment of a customs union and common security perimeter by 2010 ".

The authors point out that "The U.S. Congress has no formal role in the SPP. As criticism of the lack of transparency and public accountability of the SPP negotiations has grown, congressional interest and concern about the SPP has also grown. There is now a handful of Members of Congress (concentrated, for now, in the House of Representatives) publicly opposed to proceeding with the SPP, and determined to convene investigations and oversight into the content of the talks. Congressional hostility represents the biggest threat to the continuation of the SPP after Montebello, and after the end of the Bush administration".

( Editor's note: The SPP was started when Brian Mulroney was Prime Minister of Canada, Carlos Salinas was President of Mexico, and George H.W. Bush was President of the United States. Each of these three men was advanced in his political career by the support of David Rockefeller, the Trilateral Commission, and the Council on Foreign Relations.)

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